Beyond dichotomies: A multi-stage model of governance in professional service firms by Empson, L.
Empson, L. (2012). Beyond dichotomies: A multi-stage model of governance in professional 
service firms. In: M. Reihlen & A. Werr (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Entrepreneurship in 
Professional Services. (pp. 274-294). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 
9781848446267 
City Research Online
Original citation: Empson, L. (2012). Beyond dichotomies: A multi-stage model of governance in 
professional service firms. In: M. Reihlen & A. Werr (Eds.), Handbook of Research on 
Entrepreneurship in Professional Services. (pp. 274-294). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. ISBN 9781848446267 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/15421/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
To be cited as 
Empson, L.  (2012). Beyond Dichotomies: A Multi-Stage Model Of Governance In 
Professional Service Firms.  In Handbook of Research on Entrepreneurship in 
Professional Services, Editors, Reihlen, M., and Werr, A., Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
 
Chapter outline 
 
This study asks: how does governance change over time as a professional service firm 
(PSF) increases in size and complexity? Governance has long been a central theme in 
the literature on PSFs. Previous studies have presented dichotomized models of 
organizational archetypes and legal forms: professional partnership versus managed 
professional business, adhocracy versus professional bureaucracy, partnership versus 
corporation, private versus public corporation. The current study argues that this 
approach ignores the variety of governance forms within the PSF sector– in reality a 
PSF will adopt multiple forms of governance over time as it increases in scale and 
complexity. Adapting Greiner’s classic model of the stages of organizational growth, 
this study presents a multi-stage model of governance in PSFs. The study highlights the 
crises and reversals that may occur during this process of evolution by presenting two 
cases: a small, young corporation and a long-established, large global partnership. The 
chapter concludes by analyzing the key conceptual differences between Greiner’s 
generic model and this study’s PSF-specific model and argues that these differences are 
associated with the distinctive nature of power dependencies within a PSF.  
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Introduction 
 
As Reihlen and Werr (forthcoming) explain, the entrepreneurial inclinations of 
professionals potentially represent a significant challenge to the firms that employ them. 
Whilst professionals typically lack the risk-seeking propensities of entrepreneurs, they 
share certain important qualities: namely, their resistance to managerial control, their 
expectation of building their own business, and their ambitions for ownership 
(Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1995; Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian, & Samuel, 1998; 
Daicoff, 2004; Raelin, 1991; Shane & Eckhardt, 2003; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
Professional service firms (PSFs) must therefore find ways of controlling and 
coordinating the entrepreneurialism of individual professionals to ensure that they serve 
the interests of the firm. The partnership form of governance represents a potential 
means of achieving this. 
 
In partnerships, professionals themselves are owners of the firm and share unlimited 
personal liability for the actions of the firm. They are traditionally characterized by 
collegial clan control and informal methods of mutual monitoring and adjustment 
(Adler, Kwon, & Heckscher, 2008; Covaleski et al., 1998). However, as professional 
service firms increase in size and complexity over time, professionals tend to delegate 
authority to an elected management group who start to introduce more explicit 
management systems and structures to control their activities (Cooper, Hinings, 
Greenwood, & Brown, 1996). The innate entrepreneurial qualities of the individual 
professionals risk becoming subordinated to ‘corporate’-style systems and structures 
which serve to strengthen managerial hierarchies and centralize control (Empson, 2007).  
 4 
Numerous studies of PSF governance distinguish between professional service firms 
which perpetuate informal collegial clan control with those which adopt more explicitly 
‘corporate’ governance systems and structures. The distinction is typically posed in 
stark terms: partnership versus corporation (Empson & Chapman, 2006; Empson, 
2007), private versus public corporation (Von Nordenflycht, 2007), adhocracy versus 
professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1983) or professional partnership versus managed 
professional business (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990). The 
PSF governance literature, therefore, emphasizes dichotomized perspectives on 
governance which tend to ignore the complex variety of forms of governance prevalent 
within the professional service firm sector.  
 
Historical and sociological studies of professional sectors, such as accounting (Hinings, 
Greenwood, & Cooper, 1999), architecture (Blau, 1987), investment banking (Augur, 
2008), law (Galanter & Palay, 1993; Nelson, 1988), and management consulting 
(McKenna, 2010), present more detailed perspectives on the development of systems 
and structures of governance in specific professional service firms. However, while 
these studies may offer valuable narratives located in specific institutional and historical 
contexts, they are unable to present a more generalizable framework.  
 
The current study asks, how does governance change over time as a professional 
service firm increases in size and complexity? More specifically, how can ownership 
and power be transferred from the firm’s entrepreneurial founders to a more diffuse 
group of professionals? When ownership and authority are diffused amongst a large 
group of professionals, how does power become concentrated amongst a smaller group 
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of senior managers? Ultimately, how does the balance of power shift around a 
professional service firm?  
 
The current study develops a multi-stage model of evolutionary and revolutionary 
change in PSF governance - adapting Greiner’s classic but generic model of the stages 
of organizational growth (1972, 1998) to the distinctive context of professional service 
firms. It shows how, as a professional service firm increases in size and complexity over 
time, unresolved governance problems may precipitate organizational crises and that 
these crises may in turn lead to dramatic shifts in the balance of power within the firm. 
The current study goes further, to illustrate the complex and messy reality of the process 
of evolution in the governance of a professional service firm by presenting two cases: a 
small, young corporation and a long-established, large global partnership. These cases 
emphasize the crises and reversals that can occur during aborted attempts at governance 
change. The chapter concludes by analyzing the key conceptual differences between 
Greiner’s generic model and the PSF-specific model and argues that these differences 
are associated with the distinctive nature of power dependencies within a professional 
service firm.  
 
Alternative perspectives on governance  
 
The concept of governance encompasses three core themes: power, benefit, and 
accountability (Mellon, 1995). In other words: who determines and controls the 
activities of the firm? For what purpose and for whose benefit does the firm act? and 
who is held accountable for the consequences of these actions? These three themes run 
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throughout the literature on PSF governance, though they are generally not addressed 
explicitly. Instead, PSF governance research has tended to focus on two main topics: the 
implications of the choice of legal form and distinctions between organizational 
archetypes.  
 
Legal form  
 
Partnership has generally been viewed as particularly well suited to organizing 
professionals and has long been the prevailing form of governance within the 
professional services sector (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Greenwood & Empson, 2003; 
Hinings, Brown, & Greenwood, 1991; Leibowitz & Tollison, 1980; Rajan & Zingales, 
2000; Wilhelm & Downing, 2001). The unlimited liability partnership provides a legal 
context in which it is possible to reconcile the competing claims of three sets of 
stakeholders: professionals seeking to self actualize, owners seeking to maximize 
shareholder value, and clients seeking high quality service and value for money 
(Empson & Chapman, 2006; Empson, 2007). The competing demands of client 
satisfaction, professional self-actualization, and income maximization are aligned in 
partnerships by ensuring that the professionals are both co-producers and owners with 
unlimited personal liability for the actions of their colleagues. They, therefore, have a 
vested financial interest in ensuring high quality standards and imposing stringent 
performance expectations on themselves and their peers.  
 
As many professional service firms have increased dramatically in scale and complexity 
in the past few decades, the traditional processes of collective decision-making and 
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informal methods of mutual monitoring among partners has proven impractical. When 
large professional partnerships adopt more seemingly ‘corporate’ methods of 
hierarchical and bureaucratic control, this raises questions about the value of retaining 
partnership as a legal form. Many partnerships have chosen to incorporate (Empson, 
2007; Greenwood & Empson, 2003). In addition to the challenges of increasing size and 
complexity which affect the governance of all firms, Greenwood and Empson’s (2003) 
study highlights five PSF-specific factors which have caused many professional service 
firms to incorporate: increasing heterogeneity, capital-intensity, commoditization, 
litigation, and the declining appeal of partnership. In certain sectors, where these factors 
prevail, there has been a wholesale flight from partnership.  
 
A limited number of studies have begun to explore the implications of changing forms 
of PSF governance for issues such as strength of financial performance, quality of client 
service, and core principles of governance. Greenwood, Deephouse, and Li’s (2007) 
study of consulting firms found that both private corporations and partnerships 
outperformed public corporations in terms of growth in revenue and staff numbers. In 
terms of quality of client service, VonNordenflycht’s (2007) study of publicly-quoted 
and privately-held advertising agencies found no difference in measures of creativity. In 
terms of the core principles of governance, Empson and Chapman (2006) found that 
corporations can ‘mimic’ the partnership form of governance through deliberate 
management of their systems and structures. 
 
These recent studies recognize the variety of ownership structures that exist within the 
professional service firm sector and have begun to explore the consequences of 
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contemporary developments in PSF governance. However, they are essentially static in 
their orientation. In other words, they study alternative legal forms but say nothing 
about how or why professional service firms move between legal forms. 
  
Organizational archetypes 
 
Studies of archetypes in the professional service firm sector have sought to identify 
alternative ‘idealized’ forms - and the systems, structures, and interpretive schemes 
through which they are manifested. Mintzberg’s study (1983) does not refer to the 
concept of archetypes explicitly but, in identifying the Adhocracy and the Professional 
Bureaucracy, recognizes the distinction between those professional service firms that 
comprise relatively loose associations of autonomous professionals and those which 
adopt more conventionally hierarchical and explicitly managed ‘corporate’ systems and 
structures..  
 
Greenwood et al. (1990) and Cooper et al. (1996) have developed the professional 
service firm archetype more explicitly with their concepts of the Professional 
Partnership, or ‘P2’, and the Managerial Professional Business, or ‘MPB’ which focuses 
on two alternative interpretive schemes of governance and the different systems and 
structures through which they are expressed. Both of these studies are extensively cited 
by scholars of professional service firms (with a collective ISI Web of Knowledge 
citation count of more than 150 published articles). However, these concepts are very 
rarely operationalized and applied systematically to the analysis of empirical data. 
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Notable exceptions include studies by Reihlen, Albers, and Kewitz (2009), Richter, 
Dickmann, and Graubner (2008), and Pinnington and Morris (2002, 2003). 
 
The majority of studies of professional service firm archetypes deploy the concepts of 
P2 and MPB as an intellectual short-hand for distinguishing between the 
professionalized partnership and the more commercialized ‘corporate’ style of firm. 
This approach promulgates a somewhat simplistic distinction between two dichotomous 
types of professional service firms: i.e. the relatively small and informal firm versus the 
relatively large and bureaucratic firm. Other studies (Harlacher & Reihlen, 2010; 
Malhotra, Morris, & Hinings, 2006) examine a wider variety of archetypes in the 
professional service firm sector but even these studies do not explain systematically 
how a professional service firm moves between archetypes.  
 
This limitation of professional service firm archetype studies is perhaps surprising as 
the core studies on which they are based (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; Miller & 
Friesen, 1980) explicitly address the issue of transitions between archetypes. Miller and 
Friesen acknowledge the forces of inertia which surround organizational archetypes and 
argue that extreme changes or even crises in organizational conditions are required to 
bring about archetype change. Greenwood and Hinings (1988) go further to elaborate 
the concept of ‘tracks’ as a means of understanding the process by which organizations 
move between archetypes.  
 
Greenwood and Hinings emphasize that ‘non-linear tracks’ or reversals are more 
common than the literature on change suggests and that ‘aborted excursions’ are 
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particularly likely when established power relationships are mobilized to protect the 
status quo. The concept of organizational tracks also emphasizes that organizations 
develop over time as they grow and that theories of organizational change need to 
recognize the significance of an organization’s history for its process of development. 
Greenwood and Hinings argue that, in this way, the concept of tracks is consistent with 
lifecycle models of organizational development. This is further reflected in the work by 
Miller and Friesen who, having explored the concept of archetype change in their 1980 
article, address the concept of organizational lifecyles more explicitly in their 1984 
article. 
 
Stages of organizational growth 
 
Lifecycle models provide some useful insights into the question of how firms develop 
from their initial entrepreneurial start-up stage to become large and mature 
organizations. These studies identify a number of key stages in a firm’s development 
and emphasize the periodic ‘crises’ which precipitate a move to the subsequent stage 
(see Hanks, Watson, Jansen, & Chandler, 1993, and McMahon, 1998, for a detailed 
summary). The specific stages identified vary according to the focus and scope of the 
study (e.g. industry sector, aspect of management practice etc.) but tend to place 
emphasis on the earliest ‘entrepreneurial’ stages of development. 
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While lifecycle models have been criticized on a number of counts1, they nevertheless 
represent a useful analytical lens for developing a more nuanced understanding of 
governance in professional service firms. Greiner’s model of the stages of 
organizational growth (1972, 1998) is the most widely cited of these models (with a 
current ISI Web of Knowledge citation count of almost 350 published articles)  
 
Greiner’s model is based on five key assertions (which are consistent with Greenwood 
and Hinings’, 1988, concept of tracks): 
 An organization will pass through several stages as it grows and matures.  
 Organizational solutions which are appropriate at a certain stage in an 
organization’s growth will cease to be appropriate as it grows and matures. 
 Management may be slow to recognize the need for change until the 
underlying problems become acute.  
 These problems may precipitate dramatic upheavals or ‘crises’. 
 At any stage, failure to deal with these issues may lead to the reversal or even 
death of the organization (the ultimate ‘failure to mature’).  
Greiner asserts, therefore, that an organization passes through a specified series of 
stages of growth via alternating periods of evolution and revolution or, to use less 
dramatic language, an organization will experience periods of gradual development 
                                                 
1
 A recent review of the lifecycle literature identifies 33 distinct models, which share many fundamental 
premises but present variations on established typologies (Phelps, Adams, & Bessant, 2007). Two factors 
help explain the lack of convergence on a common model: the lack of specificity about the concept 
‘lifestage’ (Aldrich, 1999; Hanks et al., 1993) and the lack of empirical foundations to many of the 
studies (Drazin & Kazanjian, 1993; Levie & Hay, 1998; Miller & Friesen, 1982). Lifecycle models can 
also be criticized for blurring the distinction between description and prescription (Andersen, 2008). 
Whereas Greiner and Malernee (2005, p. 275) argue quite modestly that lifecycle models ‘provide a 
roadmap (of) what lies ahead’, Phelps et al., 2007 suggest that all firms should, and indeed must, pass 
through the specific stages if they are to grow and mature. 
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punctuated by periods of dramatic change. Greiner, therefore, presents a ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ model of organizational change (Gersick, 1991), consistent with the 
concept of tracks developed by Greenwood and Hinings (1988).  
 
Greiner’s model was developed without reference to professional service firms. He 
acknowledged this limitation in the 1998 revision to his 1972 article by alluding to his 
ongoing research into law, consulting and investment firms and subsequently presented 
a model of the stages of growth in consulting firms which differed substantially from 
his original study (Greiner & Mallernee, 2005). Unfortunately, the stages identified by 
Greiner and Mallernee are primarily associated with the entrepreneurial start-up stage of 
growth and say little explicitly about governance. The study does, however, recognize 
the variety of different organizational structures, management styles, decision processes, 
systems and rewards which may be adopted as a consulting firm develops. Greiner and 
Mallernee, therefore, implicitly challenge the dichotomized perspectives on governance 
that prevail within the professional service firm literature.  
 
Methods 
 
In the current study, a multi-stage model of PSF governance was derived from in-depth 
case studies of multiple professional service firms: four management consulting firms, 
four law firms, three accounting firms, and two actuarial firms. These case studies 
formed part of three research projects funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council of Great Britain, which the author conducted over a 15 year period. The firms 
studied ranged in size from 30 to 190 000 staff and £4 million to £15 billion fee income. 
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The youngest firm had been in existence for 10 years at the time when the research was 
conducted and the oldest 117 years.  
 
As part of these studies, over 500 hours of interviews were conducted, alongside 
archival analysis and detailed observation of meetings. Since the studies were 
processural in nature and concerned with change, substantial amounts of historical and 
contextual data were gathered in the course of the interviews as interviewees offered 
narratives of organizational development going back over many decades. Published 
organizational histories of some of the firms were also studied. In the newer and 
younger firms, detailed data was available about the early stage of growth. In the larger 
and more mature firms, data about the later stages of growth was more plentiful.  
 
In analyzing the historical accounts that organizational members presented, consistent 
narratives emerged. When applied to the basic structure of Greiner’s framework, these 
narratives support Greiner’s core assertion that organizations pass through a series of 
identifiable stages as they grow and mature. Given the similarity of the historical 
narratives presented in the 13 case studies, it has been possible to develop a multi-stage 
model of governance which is specific to the context of professional service firms. In 
the following section a conceptual overview of the model is presented. Given the 
limitations of space it is not possible to present detailed data for all the firms studied but 
in subsequent sections two detailed cases are presented which illustrate the complex and 
messy reality of ‘aborted excursions’ in governance change in professional service 
firms.  
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Greiner acknowledges the empirical limitations of his model in his revision to the 1972 
article but argues that it represents ‘a simple outline of the broad challenges facing 
management concerned with change’ (1998: 65). The model presented in this current 
study shares some of the empirical limitations of Greiner’s study but, by presenting ‘a 
simple outline’, the model provides a useful analytical device for exploring the 
question: how does governance change over time as a professional service firm 
increases in size and complexity?  
 
A multi-stage model of governance in professional service firms 
 
The model is presented in Figure I and described below. Illustrative quotes from five of 
the 13 case studies are presented in Table 1. The PSF-specific model focuses on the two 
key contingencies of age and size (as does Greiner’s generic model). It identifies the 
various phases of governance that a professional service firm may pass through as it 
grows and matures and highlights the potential ‘crises’ or transition points. However, as 
Greenwood and Hinings (1988: 308) emphasize, ‘change may be fitful and replete with 
oscillations and delays rather than an ordered and consistent revolution.’ The conceptual 
model is, therefore, supplemented by two case studies: a small, young corporation 
(‘BoutiqueCo’) and a long-established, large global partnership (‘MegaPartners’). The 
model below is therefore a conceptual framework which describes the broad pattern of 
development of PSF governance observed over the course of the research studies, while 
the detailed case studies illustrate two ‘aborted excursions’ (to use Greenwood and 
Hinings’, 1988, terminology).  
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INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Founder-focussed  
 
In the early, Founder-focussed years, governance in a professional service firm is 
relatively simple. In the absence of external shareholders, power, benefit and 
accountability reside exclusively and unambiguously with the entrepreneurial founders. 
As is typical in a start-up operation (Mintzberg, 1983), management systems and 
structures are limited and informal. If the firm succeeds and grows, the founders will 
recruit more senior professional fee-earning staff to sell and manage the projects - the 
precise proportion of senior to junior staff hired will depend upon the model of leverage 
the founders are operating (Maister, 1982).  
 
In time, these senior professionals will expect an increasing involvement in the firm’s 
decision-making processes and share of the profits, reflecting their own entrepreneurial 
tendencies and desire for autonomy and ownership. However, the founders have made a 
considerable financial and personal investment in the firm and may be reluctant to 
surrender management authority or ownership – particularly if the senior professionals 
lack sufficient funds to pay an attractive price. The first governance ‘crisis’ arises if 
unenfranchised senior professionals start to resent their Exclusion.  
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The problems surrounding this crisis of governance are illustrated in detail later in this 
chapter through the case study of a Founder-focussed firm, ‘BoutiqueCo’. It 
demonstrates the consequence of the entrepreneurial founders’ failure to deal effectively 
with their senior professionals’ sense of Exclusion from the governance of the firm, in 
spite of their professed commitment to a Collegial style of governance.  
 
Collegial 
 
In order to move to the Collegial phase of development, founders must be willing to sell 
or transfer some of their equity to their senior professionals and to involve them in the 
decision-making processes within the firm. As long as the founders remain in the firm, 
they will retain informal influence, but gradually the power of the collective 
partner/director group will become more fully established. Decision-making will remain 
consensus-based amongst the expanded group of owners, typically focussed on a 
weekly meeting of all partners/directors. The management systems and structures may 
remain ill-defined and the fee-earning staff employed to administer these systems kept 
to a minimum.  
 
If the firm continues to grow, the number of internal owners will increase and, along 
with this, the number of people who need to be consulted in order to establish a 
consensus. In time, the partners/directors may become concerned about the slow pace of 
decision-making and inadequacy of the management systems and structures as they 
become frustrated by their growing sense of Disorganization. They may respond by 
establishing Committees.  
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Committee 
 
The Committee phase arises because partners/directors recognize that they can no 
longer be involved in all aspects of management but are not yet ready to relinquish 
management authority to a full-time manager. Their solution is to create a series of 
committees, on which they take turns to serve, to undertake hiring, promotion, 
budgeting, marketing, strategy and other core management tasks.  
 
While these committees may initially resolve the problem of disorganization, new 
problems will arise if the firm continues to grow. Committees proliferate and increasing 
numbers of partners/directors gradually become involved in management. Frustration 
builds among professionals, as hoped-for efficiency gains fail to materialize and 
management activities consume increasing amounts of time to limited effect.  
 
Up until this stage, the core themes of governance - power, benefit, and accountability - 
have remained essentially bound together, albeit embedded within an increasingly large 
partner/director group. The Delegated phase is the point at which this interweaving of 
power, benefit, and accountability are unpicked for the first time. A professional service 
firm can only progress to the Delegated phase if partners/directors are willing to 
relinquish management authority to one or more of their peers.  
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Delegated  
 
In the Delegated phase, the partners/directors of the firm delegate a limited degree of 
power to one of two individuals (variously called a Senior Partner, Managing Partner, 
Chairman, Managing Director or CEO) on the understanding that they accept that 
benefit must still lie with the partner/director group. Power remains contingent, 
however, and inextricably bound up with accountability -  partners/directors can rescind 
the delegation of authority at any stage, either through formal governance procedures or 
through a more informal collective ‘loss of confidence’ in the individual. In other 
words, this authority is delegated from the partners/directors to specific individuals at a 
point in time and is not evidence that they have accepted the principle of the separation 
of power, benefit, and accountability in more general terms.  
 
In time the senior executives may become frustrated with the limitations on their power 
and may argue that the increased scale and complexity of the firm necessitates 
increased formalization of the management systems and structures and to enable 
them to take concerted action. If they attempt to exercise this authority without 
first convincing the majority of their partners/directors to cede further authority 
to them, the result may be a crisis of Disconnection.  
 
The problems surrounding this crisis of governance are illustrated in detail in the case 
study of ‘MegaPartners’, presented later in this chapter. This demonstrates the 
consequence of the Disconnection crisis as senior management attempt to impose 
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Corporate’ systems and structures on partners who are still strongly committed to a 
more traditional partnership-style approach to governance.  
 
‘Corporate’, Federated, (or Dispersed)  
 
If a substantial subgroup of partners/directors are unwilling to accept a move to a 
Corporate or Federated structure, then the firm may become Dispersed. Dissatisfied 
entrepreneurial individuals leave to set up their own firms and thus revert to the 
Founder-focussed phase of governance. 
 
However, the firm can move on to the ‘Corporate’ phase (regardless of whether it is 
actually a corporate or remains a partnership in legal form) if the partners/directors 
accept further delegation of authority to the management group. This leads to the 
establishment of more centralized systems and structures of governance. Alternatively, 
the partners/directors may prefer to adopt a Federated approach to governance (such as 
currently prevails within the Big 4 accounting firms global networks). A federated style 
recognizes that the firm has become too large and complex to manage as a single 
unified entity in its current form of governance but avoids moving into the ‘Corporate’ 
phase by operating as a group of smaller relatively loosely connected units. Each of 
these units, therefore, can potentially revert to the Collegial phase. In time, however, as 
the Big 4 accounting firms are now doing, the partners/directors may recognize the 
limitations of the federal form and explore means of moving towards a more centrally 
controlled ‘Corporate’ style of governance.  
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Crises and reversals 
 
As with Greiner’s model, the multi-stage governance model appears to suggest that each 
stage follows on sequentially from an appropriate and inevitable crisis. In reality the 
process of ‘evolution and revolution’ is more complex. Crises will arise from a failure 
to resolve underlying tensions in governance but will not lead inevitably to the next 
stage in the process.  
 
In the following sections, case studies of two professional service firms are presented 
which highlight particularly problematic stages in the evolution of professional service 
firms: the awkward transition from Founder-focussed to Collegial and the associated 
crisis of Exclusion, and the problems that arise in attempting to move from Delegated 
to ‘Corporate’ and the Disconnection crisis that ensues. 
 
From Founder-focussed to Collegial: the Exclusion crisis, explores how the founders 
and employees of a small, young corporation (BoutiqueCo2) struggled unsuccessfully 
for several years to find a governance structure which reconciled the founders’ desire to 
step back from the day-to-day management of the business (and to realize the value of 
their investment) with their employees’ desire for a stake in the ownership and 
management of the firm. Whilst the founders appeared to be genuinely committed to 
resolving the professed issue of Exclusion and to replace the Founder-focussed style 
with a more Collegial style of governance, their actions repeatedly undermined their 
                                                 
2
 Names of the firms, individuals and certain titles have been changed to preserve anonymity. To further 
preserve the anonymity of the firms, the sectors in which they operate have been disguised. Their form of 
governance, however, which is the focus of the study, has been described in detail. 
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protestations. They were unwilling to hand over sufficient levels of responsibility or 
ownership to satisfy their employees and took decisions without consultation. This 
ultimately provoked a severe organizational crisis. Eventually the founders and 
employees concluded that an acquisition was the only way to resolve their intractable 
problem of governance. 
 
From Delegated to ‘Corporate’: the Disconnection crisis, explores another aborted 
change in governance. In this case the senior management of a long-established large 
global partnership (MegaPartners) were thwarted by the partners in their attempts to 
introduce more ‘Corporate’ governance systems and structures. Although the partners 
had Delegated authority to the management group, the senior management group 
became increasingly Disconnected from the partnership and a revolt by the partners led 
to the election of an ‘anti-management’ Managing Partner. The rhetoric of partner 
inclusion and the reversal of certain decisions helped to re-establish trust in 
management. Presented with a different business context and a different management 
rhetoric, the partners ultimately accepted that a more ‘Corporate’ style of governance 
was an acceptable consequence of their desire for growth.  
  
From Founder-focussed to Collegial: the Exclusion crisis 
 
BoutiqueCo was established by three entrepreneurial individuals who had grown 
frustrated working within a global and relatively commoditized professional service 
firm. They left the firm in order to establish their own innovative practice. Their 
business concept proved successful and within three years the initial founders 
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(Margaret, Stephen, and David) had recruited a total of 27 staff on the back of rapid 
growth in client demand.  
 
From the beginning, the founders acknowledged that they would want to realize their 
investment at some point. Recognizing this, they established the firm as a corporation 
rather than the partnership, because it would be easier to dispose of equity at a later 
stage. They also believed strongly in encouraging staff to have a sense of ‘ownership’ in 
the business, both literally in terms of shares, and figuratively in terms of a sense of 
involvement in decision-making. So, within five years of establishing BoutiqueCo, the 
founders had sold 10% of their shares to 10 of their staff (each founder retained a 30% 
stake). To facilitate a wider sense of involvement for all staff, both professional and 
support, regular office meetings were held at which all employees discussed key 
management issues and agreed decisions together with the founders. Support staff as 
well as professional staff participated in these meetings. In this way, the founders were 
attempting to mimic aspects of the Collegial phase, whilst nevertheless retaining 
control. 
 
As the founders began to reduce their shareholdings, they also began to formalize staff 
involvement in the management of the business by creating a management structure 
which they termed the Executive. This body included five staff members and founder 
Margaret, who was CEO/Chair (see Table 2a for details of roles and membership). 
Founders Stephen and David had no formal role in the Executive, though David 
continued to be responsible for the firm’s financial management.  
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
In time, members of the Executive became frustrated by the amount of time involved in 
these discussions and the lack of authority associated with their roles.  
 
The Executive was a sort of information-sharing shop. When it came to really key 
issues it was clear that the founders still made the decisions. (Executive Member) 
 
Within two years the Executive was replaced by the Management Board (see Table 2b), 
where founder Margaret remained Chair and Chief Executive and Gareth (a highly 
experienced professional who had joined the firm two years previously) took over 
David’s responsibility for Finance. Founders David and Stephen had no formal role in 
the governance structure but continued to wield considerable informal power. Whilst 
attempting to formalize a more Collegial form of governance, the reality remained 
resolutely Founder-focussed.  
 
Where the founders disagreed with the way that the management group were 
doing things, you could feel decision-making drifting back to them. They often 
used to meet in one of the upstairs rooms. Everyone knew they were talking about 
the business – the door was shut and decisions were being taken, even though the 
Board was supposed to be managing the business. (Board Member) 
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A small group of senior employees were particularly frustrated by the founders’ power 
and wanted to be more involved in decision-making. They had joined BoutiqueCo 
relatively recently and had come from senior positions in competitor firms. 
 
These people were used to taking business decisions. They weren’t soaked in our 
culture so they were quite destabilizing. (Founder - Stephen) 
 
Their frustration was not simply about lack of involvement but also about lack of 
ownership. As discussed earlier, these individuals displayed many of the entrepreneurial 
characteristics associated with professionals. Whilst the founders had hoped to realize 
their investment over time through a management buy-out, they recognized that the 
success of the firm was making this difficult to achieve. As the fee income and 
profitability of the firm increased, the implicit value of the shares rose too high to be 
affordable for existing employees. The founders were not willing to sell their shares at a 
substantial discount. The firm was stuck in the Founder-focussed phase and unable to 
move to the Collegial phase.  
 
The increasing size of the firm was creating pressure for governance change but the 
increasing value of the firm meant that the ownership and power of the founders 
remained entrenched. As the senior professionals became increasingly frustrated, a 
crisis of Exclusion loomed. This crisis became manifest when the founders were 
approached by a potential acquirer. Now grown to 40 employees, the firm was highly 
profitable and growing rapidly. The founders recognized it was an opportune time for 
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them to realize their investment. Nevertheless, initial reactions among the founders were 
mixed. 
 
The approach came at about the time we had come to recognize that we needed a 
Senior Partner of some kind. We had been concerned about how we could realize 
our asset. We could see a synergy between the two businesses and financially the 
number they talked about was really high. (Founder – Stephen) 
 
There was a good strategic argument for working with this company. We had 
already done some work with them. There was quite a lot of money on the table. 
We had always known we would sell one day. (Founder – David) 
 
I felt very sad about the bid because I felt that the dream had gone. We were going 
to become part of a big group. But I did feel excitement about the money too…I 
had never thought about selling the firm to a third party. I had assumed we would 
go for a management buy-out. (Founder – Margaret) 
 
The founders negotiated in private with the bidder (and did not involve the Board in 
their discussions). They were concerned about unsettling staff until they had reached an 
agreement with the bidding firm and called a meeting of all staff to announce their 
decision.  
 
The atmosphere was electric. People were absolutely stunned. (Board Member) 
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It was rather a shock. It was the first time we had been TOLD that something was 
going to happen rather than consulted. (Secretary) 
 
There was a sense of betrayal. I think people thought – ‘Ha. They are just going to 
get a pile of money out of this. They have dumped us.’ (Founder - Stephen) 
 
Over the next nine months, three senior staff resigned, fee income plummeted, the 
acquiring firm withdrew its offer, and four staff were made redundant. At an offsite 
meeting the remaining staff gathered to consider the future of the company.  
 
It was an astonishing and emotional event. Feelings ran very high. People cried. 
People stormed out. A lot of stuff was processed that needed to be got 
through…but we recognized that the firm could no longer be founder-managed. 
(Associate) 
 
We had a really cathartic day. A lot of harsh things were said. The firm demanded 
to know if the founders’ hearts were still in it…There was a huge sense of 
mourning but also a demand that the founders show some real emotional and 
physical commitment to rebuilding the firm. And the founders did display that 
emotional commitment, very visibly so. (Associate) 
 
The Board was partially restructured (see Table 2c) and founders David and Stephen 
became a part of the formal management team once again. A series of steps were taken 
to introduce more rigorous systems for sales and cost management.  
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Things were looking more healthy. We had much better procedures. Much more 
discipline…Within three months we had successfully turned the firm around. But 
where to next? (Board Member - Gareth)  
 
There was strong pressure from the non-founders to change the governance structure. 
As the existing staff could not afford to buy-out the founders’ shares at market value, 
the only available option was a sale. The move to the Collegial phase could not occur, 
in spite of the founders’ rhetoric of inclusion, because the founders were not willing to 
sell at a discount.  
 
We stated clearly that we must break the parent-child relationship between the 
founders and the rest of the staff. We concluded that we had to break the capital 
structure and that this time the change would not be made in camera by the 
founders acting alone. (Board Member) 
 
Founder Stephen was tasked with finding an appropriate candidate and Gareth was 
asked to take over from founder Margaret as CEO (see Table 2c). All founders 
remained on the Board.  
 
Within 15 months BoutiqueCo was sold and ceased to exist as an independent entity. 
The 30 person firm was acquired by a privately owned corporation of 5300 staff which 
operated a strong and centralized management structure. Any attempt to develop a 
Collegial approach to governance was abandoned. In order to end the problematic 
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‘parent/child relationship’ between the founders and the employees, they concluded that 
they would have to accept a new parent for all of them. BoutiqueCo therefore failed to 
make the transition from the Founder-focussed to the Collegial. This was an ‘aborted 
excursion’, in Greenwood and Hinings’ terminology. In Greiner’s terminology, the 
ultimate consequence was organizational ‘death’. 
 
From Delegated to ‘Corporate’: the Disconnection crisis 
 
The origins of MegaPartners go back over 100 years and, over time, the firm had 
developed a dominant position in its national market. Turning its attentions to the global 
market it went on to undertake a series of international mergers in rapid succession 
which caused the firm to double in size in the space of two years. At the start of the 
research study it employed approximately 5000 professional and administrative staff 
and was owned by 500 partners.  
 
In the lead up to, and aftermath of, these mergers, MegaPartners’ Management 
Committee introduced changes to the firm’s governance structure and management 
systems. These changes included more formalized budgeting and reporting procedures 
and more globally standardized approaches to recruiting and business development. 
Taken individually, none of these changes was substantive. Looked at collectively, they 
represented a consolidated attempt to introduce centralized controls over a disparate 
global network of offices. The partners grew increasingly concerned.  
 
 29 
There was a perception that we'd become an incredibly bureaucratic organization - 
that virtually anything that we wanted to do had lots of pieces of paper attached to 
it - like if we wanted to develop our business plans there was a process of doing it 
within the practice area, and something had to be done within the product group, 
and something had to be done within an office, so you would get some poor guy in 
Spain who happened to be looking after several different product groups and 
practice areas, who now had to write something like 14 business plans. (Global 
Head of Business Development)  
 
It was not just the partners in the international network of offices who resented the 
imposition of these controls. The partners in the original firm also cherished their 
autonomy and were not ready to accept a more systematized approach to management. 
Although the main office was relatively large, with over 250 partners, within this office 
the individual practices were still able to retain elements of the Collegial structure. As 
much as possible, the partners preferred to rely upon traditional methods of mutual 
monitoring and control, electing their own practice leaders, for example, as well as their 
Managing Partner and Senior Partner.  
 
Although a vote of the full partnership was still required for all key management 
decisions (e.g. election to management roles, election of new partners and enforced 
departure of underperforming partners), the Managing Partner and Senior Partner began 
to assume increasing authority for the day-to-day management of the global firm. The 
Managing and Senior Partner were behaving as if the firm had moved into the 
Delegated phase of governance, although the partners had formally delegated only 
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limited authority to them. A substantial proportion of MegaPartners’s partners began to 
perceive that the firm was becoming ‘Corporate’. This impression was reinforced by 
certain symbolic changes, such as the Managing Partner and Senior Partner’s decision 
to change their titles to CEO and Chairman. Partners meanwhile perceived that the 
Management Committee was becoming more remote or ‘Disconnected’ from the 
partnership. 
 
Management were struggling with a whole load of quite difficult issues post 
merger, and they became more and more closed-in on themselves…They took 
decisions themselves, didn't talk to other people. I think, to the average partner, 
that appeared very arrogant. (Management Committee Partner)  
 
I think we were just getting on with trying to mould the new firm but, in doing 
that, we sort of became more authoritarian automatically. The old partners really 
noticed the difference. I think there was probably a note of over-confidence as 
well. I think we thought we were really clever to have pulled off the mergers and 
were eager to do really well. (Management Committee Partner) 
 
This was the context in which the CEO and Chairman approached the annual global 
partner retreat. The perceived attempt to move towards a ‘Corporate’ style of 
governance was about to provoke a crisis of Disconnection.  
 
The 500 partners gathered in a ballroom at the conference hotel. From the start of the 
event, partners objected to the overall design and format of the meeting, which they 
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deemed to be too highly structured and ‘infantilizing’. They were asked to sit in small 
groups at round tables and given set periods of time to work together on allocated tasks 
before reporting back to the meeting. External facilitators were brought in to lead the 
discussion and partners were asked to record their thoughts on flip charts. While this 
approach is relatively common at corporate off-site meeting, it was a novel approach for 
the partners. As owners to the firm they expected extensive time to debate the topics that 
they deemed to be important. 
  
The first task they were set was to consider the introduction of a partner appraisal 
programme, proposed by senior management. The Chairman and CEO believed that a 
standardized and transparent system would ensure fairness and consistency in the 
treatment of partners across the global network, and was preferable to the existing 
approach which relied upon informal discussions between partners and practice heads.  
 
The reactions of the partner group to this initiative were intense.  
 
My table said: we think this is unacceptable, this is something that we should be 
rejecting straight away…The next table stood up and said the same thing. There 
was then I suppose about seven hours of discussions…There was genuine hostility 
in tone against the entire management…There was absolutely not a single partner 
who spoke in favour of any of the proposals that were out there. (Business Group 
Head)  
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Part of the second day of the conference had been set aside for the election of a new 
CEO. The current CEO’s term of office was coming to an end and he had already 
publicly identified his preferred candidate (Michael). However, responding to strong 
encouragement from many partners, a second candidate put himself forward (Alistair). 
 
I think our CEO…just assumed that his nominee, Michael, would be elected. But 
there was so much anger built up by the partners…that there was a strong sense 
that someone else ought to stand. Alistair was very different from the style of our 
CEO…much more consensus-building, much more sort of charming if you like, 
and much less hard than them. (Partner)  
 
Alistair was obviously seen as an anti-management candidate, even though he was 
on the Management Committee, whereas Michael – because he was the preferred 
candidate by the CEO - was viewed as the management candidate and therefore 
had lost before he started. (Business Group Head)  
 
Alistair gave a speech which, while light on specific details, contained the promise to 
‘give the partnership back to the partners’.  
 
It was a brilliant speech. In about 30 minutes Alistair touched every single point of 
insecurity among the partners and said basically – don’t worry, everything is 
going to be all right. (Partnership Secretary) 
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At the partner conference Alistair was elected CEO by a substantial majority. As one 
member of staff explains it: 
 
We sort of rushed headlong down a corporate-style approach and then rushed 
headlong, or rather arse-end, away from it. (Business Group Head) 
 
Over the next few years Alistair made concerted efforts to rebuild the sense of 
connection between partners and management. Shortly after his election, the titles of 
Managing Partner and Senior Partner were reintroduced to replace the titles of CEO and 
Chairman. He also went beyond such symbolic changes. In promising to ‘give the 
partnership back to the partners’, Alistair committed himself to an exhausting 
programme of dialogue with the global partnership group. His relentless international 
travel programme and willingness to listen to all partners’ concerns helped to allay 
partners’ fears across the global network and resolved the crisis of Disconnection. 
However, he found it difficult to translate this activity into effective action. In retreating 
from the ‘Corporate’ style of governance, Alistair had relinquished any possibility of 
exercising Delegated authority and had, in effect, reverted to a more Collegial style of 
governance.  
 
This collegial approach proved ineffective for a large global partnership. The partners 
became increasingly concerned as many merger-related issues remained unresolved and 
profitability declined steadily. Alistair responded by appointing a new COO, Lloyd, 
who had previously been a very successful leader of a core business area within the 
firm. Lloyd was well respected for his commercial skills but somewhat feared for his 
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confrontational personal style. Using the impending financial crisis as a means of 
leveraging his own authority, Lloyd introduced wide-ranging budget cuts and tougher 
management controls. Although authority was not formally Delegated to him by the 
partners, he nevertheless acted ‘as if’ it had been. In the absence of resistance from the 
partnership he was able to introduce relatively draconian controls that would have been 
unacceptable under the previous regime. The slide in profitability was reversed.  
 
When Alistair did not put himself forward for re-election after a single four year term, 
only one candidate decided to stand – Lloyd. Promising tougher management and even 
higher profits, he was elected unopposed. A revised partner appraisal system was 
introduced shortly afterwards.  
 
Over the next few years, in an attempt to drive internal efficiencies and improve 
profitability, many more changes to the governance systems and structures were 
introduced which the partners might previously have decried as ‘Corporate’. However, 
the titles of Managing Partner and Senior Partner were retained. The senior management 
were keen to demonstrate that they were not Disconnected from the partnership as a 
whole: 
 
I think partners demand trust from management and demand to be respected. They 
need management to be accountable. And so as long as management is trusted and 
has the respect of the partners, and partners feel that the management feels 
accountable to them, then I think actually partners would be able to cede a little bit 
more in terms of autonomy to management. (Business Group Head) 
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In retrospect some of the partners recognized that their concerns about the apparent 
‘corporatization’ of the partnership were bound up with their more personal concerns 
about the previous management team who were trying to bring about the changes. 
Presented with a different rhetoric, at a different time, by a different management team, 
these moves towards a more ‘Corporate’ style of governance were viewed as less 
threatening and to some extent an inevitable consequence of rapid and profitable 
growth.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
As argued earlier, the existing literature on governance in professional service firms 
presents a variety of dichotomized models which, whether focusing on legal form or 
organizational archetype, ignore the more complex variety of forms of governance 
prevalent within the professional service firm sector. In reality a professional service 
firm may adopt multiple forms of governance over time. The study therefore asked: 
how does governance change over time as a professional service firm increases in 
size and complexity?  
 
The study developed a multi-stage model of governance in professional service firms. It 
emphasized that this process of change is not necessarily sequential, linear, or 
inevitable, and that shifts in the balance of power can be reversed in response to ‘crises’ 
of governance. Two detailed case studies showed how unresolved governance problems 
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can precipitate organizational crises which may result in dramatic shifts in the power 
dependencies within the firm and reversals in the process of governance change.  
  
The model is based on Greiner’s classic but generic model of the stages of 
organizational growth. The model is descriptive rather than prescriptive, in that it 
presents a process widely represented in the firms researched as part of this study, rather 
than arguing that all firms should or indeed must pass through all stages in sequence. It 
instead represents an analytical device for dismantling the rigid dichotomies which are 
perpetuated within the PSF governance literature.  
 
As explained earlier, the need for a PSF-specific multi-stage model of governance arises 
because the stages that Greiner identifies do not map easily onto the context of 
professional service firms. In addition, Greiner’s approach encompasses certain 
assumptions which are not applicable or are specifically misleading in the context of 
professional service firms. The differences between Greiner’s model and the PSF-
specific model developed here arise from the distinctive nature of power dependencies 
in a professional service firm. It is worth exploring these differences in detail as they 
highlight the different ways in which the central questions of power, benefit, and 
accountability are answered in a professional service firm compared to the ‘generic’ 
organization which Greiner presents. 
 
Greiner argues that the first key transition is between the Creativity and Direction 
phases. Following a crisis of Leadership, the original founders are replaced by a 
professional management group. At this point management and ownership become 
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separated within the firm and more comprehensive management systems and structures 
are introduced. Power and accountability, therefore, shift from the owners to the 
professional managers, though benefit continues to reside with the owners. 
 
The reality in professional service firms is more complex. In the move from the 
Founder-focussed to the Collegial phase (following the crisis of Exclusion) power, 
benefit, and accountability remain densely interconnected and the preserve of fee-
earning senior professionals active in the business. Before the professional service firm 
can start to experience the concentration of power that Greiner highlights, a professional 
service firm will pass through an additional stage, the Committee phase. During this 
phase management responsibilities, systems and structures become more explicit. 
However, power, benefit, and accountability remain contiguous and widely diffused 
among the fee-earners/owners/senior professionals.  
 
The professional service firm develops a cadre of professional managers at a relatively 
advanced stage in its development (compared to Greiner’s generic model). In a 
professional service firm a crisis of Frustration leads to the formal ‘Delegation’ of 
authority by the partners/directors to a small group of peers. When Greiner speaks of the 
Delegation phase, however, he is referring to something quite different – the stage at 
which management find that they are overloaded and must delegate responsibilities to 
middle management.  
 
The term ‘middle management’ is not widely used within professional service firms, in 
part because the focus on flat hierarchies and project-based working gives rise to 
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relatively simple and informal organizational structures in comparison with a 
conventional corporation of equivalent size. Thus the same term, ‘delegation’, applies to 
two fundamentally different management issues in the two models because of the 
fundamentally different nature of power dependencies in professional service firm 
compared to the generic organization that Greiner describes.  
 
In summary, therefore, the need for a PSF-specific multi-stage model of governance 
relates to the distinctive characteristics of professional work and the professionals who 
work within such firms. The individual professional (or rather the technical expertise, 
client relationships, and professional reputation associated with that individual) is 
essential to the delivery of a customized professional service. In order to deliver a 
customized professional service and retain their professional independence, 
professionals require, or at least expect, a degree of autonomy from managerial control. 
It is these distinctive power dependencies which ensure that power remains diffused 
throughout the organization and the central issues of power, benefit and accountability 
remain contiguous within the governance structure until an advanced stage in the 
professional service firm’s development.  
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Federated
Figure 1:
A multi-stage model of governance 
in professional service firms
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Table 1 
Multiple Stages of Governance in Professional Service Firms 
Illustrative Examples from Five of the Case Studies 
 
 
 
Founder-focussed 
 
 
 
Classic 
 
 
Committee 
 
 
Delegated 
 
 
‘Corporate’ 
 
Consulting firm (1) 
 
‘The ten senior vice 
presidents were the 
only guys who 
confronted Bob [the 
Founder] and got 
away with it … We 
were at a senior 
management 
conference. Bob 
handed out badges 
to us which said ‘No 
whining’ and told us 
to put them on. Then 
he said, ‘I’ve sold 
the company’.’ 
(Vice President)   
 
 
Consulting firm (2) 
 
‘The partners had a 
huge amount of 
autonomy when it 
came to developing 
business. There 
was no attempt to 
control what they 
were doing. It was 
almost anarchic.’ 
(Partner) 
 
 
Actuarial firm (1)  
 
‘We had a Central 
Committee that 
appointed 
membership to all 
the other committees 
– the Operations 
Committee, the 
Finance Committee, 
the Marketing 
Committee etc.… 
The committees met 
monthly. There was 
no decision-making 
between meetings 
and decision-making 
was only by the 
consensus of those 
committees.’  
(Partner)  
 
Accounting firm (1)  
 
‘As accountants we 
deal with the 
consequences of 
bad management in 
our clients. When 
we come across a 
colleague who 
really knows how 
to manage we are 
generally happy to 
let him get on with 
running our firm – 
though we do of 
course keep a 
careful eye on what 
he’s up to.’  
(Partner) 
 
  
 
Accounting firm (2) 
 
‘The decisions of the 
Managing Partner are 
absolute as long as 
he has the confidence 
of the partnership. As 
very few decisions 
are actually voted on 
it is very important 
for the Managing 
Partner to ensure that 
he keeps in tune with 
his colleagues.’  
(Partner) 
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Table 2: Evolution of Management Structure – BoutiqueCo 
 
Table 2a – Year 5 – The Executive 
People Roles 
Margaret  Chief Executive (Chair) 
Brian  People and Recruitment 
Chris  Resource Management 
Phil  Project Management 
Gareth  Quality 
Steve  Sales 
 
Table 2b – Year 7 – The Board 
People Roles 
Margaret  Chief Executive (Chair) 
Gareth  Finance 
Ian  Project Management 
Chris  Sales 
Ronan  Marketing 
Julian  People and Recruitment 
 
Table 2c – Year 8 – The Board 
People Roles 
Margaret Chief Executive (Chair) 
Gareth Finance 
David  Board Member 
Stephen Board Member 
Others Roles Unchanged 
 
Table 2d – Year 9 – The Board 
People Roles 
Gareth  Chief Executive 
David  Finance Director 
Eric  Marketing Director 
Margaret  Consulting Services Director 
Chris  Sales and Resourcing Director 
Julian Personnel Director 
Stephen  Governance Director 
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